PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARK AGAINST TRADEMARK DILUTION IN THAILAND by Boonyakiat, Ms. Orachoon
116 | A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปี ที่  4  ฉ บั บ ที่  2  ก ร ก ฎ า ค ม  –  ธั น ว า ค ม  2 5 5 6  
อรชุณห ์บุณยเกยีรต ิ  บทความ 
PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARK AGAINST  
TRADEMARK DILUTION IN THAILAND 
การคุ้มครองแก่เครือ่งหมายการค้าท่ีมีช่ือเสียงแพร่หลาย 
ในกรณีท่ีถกูท าให้เส่ือมเสียคณุค่าในประเทศไทย 
 
Ms. Orachoon Boonyakiat* 
อรชุณห ์บุณยเกยีรต ิ
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Now a day, the legal protection for well-known marks has been expanding to 
cover the protection not only against the unauthorized use of a similar or identical 
trademark by another person, which cause the public consumers to be misled or 
confused on the origins or sources of the goods but the law has also expanded to cover 
the protection against the unauthorized use of a trademark that is identical with or similar 
to a famous mark in a way that would lessen the distinctive quality of such trademark. In 
other word, traditional trademark law on confusion-based liability aims to ensure 
consumer protection, and the protection of the quality of information transmitted to 
consumers. On the other hand, the traditional trademark law on confusion-based liability 
has expanded to cover the concept of dilution-based liability in order to protect 
trademarks as a property right, by securing an investment from the trademark owner to 
establish and promote such strong mark.  
For example, let us consider the use of a trademark, which is similar to or 
identical with the famous Kodak Trademark for cameras, by another party for a 
completely non-competing product such as pianos or bathtubs. In this case, Kodak by 
Eastman Company would not be successful in filing the claim under traditional trademark 
law because the related law in such situations requires that an unauthorized party sell 
goods that are directly competitive with, or at least related to, those goods sold by the 
trademark owner, in order to constitute confusion-based liability. 
                                                          
*น.ม. (กฎหมายธุรกจิ) มหาวทิยาลยัธรรมศาสตร.์ E-mail: boonyakiat.mook@gmail.com 
 
A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปี ที่  4  ฉ บั บ ที่  2  ก ร ก ฎ า ค ม  –  ธั น ว า ค ม  2 5 5 6  | 117 
อรชุณห ์บุณยเกยีรต ิ  บทความ 
The concept underlying the trademark dilution doctrine is based on the protection 
of producers, traders or manufacturers because under this doctrine, a trademark has 
been viewed as a valuable asset of the trademark owner. As the trademark owner has 
invested massive amounts of money and put considerable effort in making the mark 
highly distinctive and famous. The law seeks to prevent diminution in the value of a 
famous mark from the unauthorized uses of other marks, even when consumers are not 
confused as to the source of the goods or services. This is because the trademarks that 
are identical with or similar to the famous mark have been used in non-competing 
markets. Such use can diminish or dilute the mark’s selling power and distinctive value 
because the mark is no longer associated with a single source. 
In Thailand, although a well-known trademark has long been protected and in 
practice, there are many dilution-like cases which the well-known marks are protected 
against trademark dilution by the determination by the court but there is no legal 
provision explicitly specifying the protection of well-known marks in the Trademark Act.  
Therefore, this Article suggests that it is an appropriate time for Thailand to 
amend and incorporate an anti-dilution law in the Trademark Act, in order to protect the 
benefits of consumers, and to promote fair competition for traders, and especially the 
owner's of famous/well-known marks in Thailand, by entitling them to impose civil 
liabilities against trademark dilution. 
 
บทคดัย่อ 
 
ในปจัจุบนั กฎหมายคุ้มครองเครื่องหมายการค้าที่มชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายได้มกีารขยาย
ขอบเขตการคุ้มครองใหร้วมถงึการคุ้มครองเครื่องหมายการคา้ แมเ้ครื่องหมายการคา้นัน้จะจดั
อยู่ในสนิค้าคนละจ าพวกกนั  กล่าวคอื หลกัการทัว่ไปเครื่องหมายการย่อมไดร้บัความคุม้ครอง
โดยหา้มมใิห้บุคคลอื่นใช้หรอืจดทะเบยีนเครื่องหมายการคา้ที่เหมอืนหรอืคลา้ยกบัเครื่องหมาย
การคา้ทีจ่ดทะเบยีนแล้ว โดยค าว่าเหมอืนหรอืคล้ายนัน้ถูกก าหนดขอบเขตใหเ้หมอืนหรอืคลา้ย
ในกรณทีีเ่ครือ่งหมายการคา้ใชใ้นสนิคา้จ าพวกเดยีวกนัหรอืจ าพวกใกลเ้คยีงกนัเท่านัน้ อย่างไรก็
ตามส าหรบัเครื่องหมายการค้าที่มชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายนัน้ ย่อมได้รบัความคุ้มครองทางกฎหมาย              
แมเ้ครือ่งหมายการคา้นัน้จะถูกน ามาใชใ้นสนิคา้คนละจ าพวกกนั 
ตวัอย่างเช่นการใช้เครื่องหมายการค้าที่เหมอืนหรอืคล้ายกับเครื่องหมายการค้าที่มี
ชื่อเสยีงแพร่หลาย โกดกั(Kodak) ซึง่จดทะเบยีนไวส้ าหรบัสนิค้าจ าพวกกลอ้งถ่ายรปู  กบัสนิค้า
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ต่างจ าพวก เช่น สุขภณัฑ ์อ่างอาบน ้า หรอืเปียโนนัน้ โดยหลกักฎหมายทัว่ไป กรณีนี้ถอืได้ว่า
การใช้เครื่องหมายโกดกัส าหรบัอ่างอาบน ้านัน้เป็นการใช้เครื่องหมายการค้ากับสินค้าคนละ
จ าพวกและเป็นสนิค้าที่ไม่มกีารแข่งขนัทางการค้าต่อกนั จงึไม่เข่าข่ายที่จะท าให้สาธารณะชน
สบัสนหลงผดิได ้แต่ตามหลกัการคุม้ครองเครือ่งหมายการคา้ทีม่ชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายนัน้ แมจ้ะเป็น 
การใช้เครื่องหมายการค้ากบัประเภทสนิค้าต่างจ าพวกก็ย่อมเรยีกได้ว่าเครื่องหมายการค้านัน้
ละเมิดเครื่องหมายการค้าที่มีชื่อเสียงแพร่หลายโดยท าให้เครื่องหมายการค้าที่มีชื่อเสียง
แพร่หลายนัน้เสื่อมถอย เสื่อมคุณค่าที่สะสมชื่อเสยีงมายาวนาน กล่าวคอืหลกัของการคุ้มครอง
เครื่องหมายการค้าทีม่ชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายนัน้มุ่งคุม้ครองตวัเครื่องหมายการค้าเอง ซึง่ไดจ้ากรบั
ชื่อเสยีงและความภกัดจีากลกูคา้ทีส่ะสมมายาวนาน ร่วมกบัการลงทุนทีสู่งเพื่อสรา้งแบรนดส์รา้ง
สมความมชีื่อเสยีงในตวัเครื่องหมายการค้านัน้ เมื่อเครื่องหมายการค้าที่มชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลาย
ไดร้บัการยอมรบัเป็นทีรู่จ้กัอย่างแพร่หลาย ลูกคา้จะมคีวามภกัดต่ีอแบรนด ์ท าใหเ้มื่อมคีนอื่นน า
เครือ่งหมายการคา้ทีเ่หมอืนหรอืคลา้ยไปใช ้ประชาชนจงึไม่เพยีงเกดิความสบัสนหลงผดิ ฉงนใจ 
แต่ความเหมอืนคลา้ยนัน้จะปรากฏในสามญัส านึกของลูกคา้เสมอ แมจ้ะเป็นการใชใ้นกรณีทีเ่ป็น
สนิคา้ต่างจ าพวกกนั 
ในประเทศไทยนัน้ แมศ้าลจะขยายความนิยามของความเหมอืนคลา้ยใหก้วา้งขึ้นเพื่อให้
ความคุม้ครองแก่เครื่องหมายการค้าทีม่ชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายในกรณีที่ถูกท าใหเ้สื่อมเสยีคุณค่าลง 
(Dilution) ในหลายคด ีแต่ตามอย่างไรกต็าม ไม่พบว่ามตีวับทใดที่ก าหนดนิยาม ขอบเขต หรอื
หลกัการใหค้วามคุม้ครองน้ีในพระราชบญัญตัเิครื่องหมายการค้าฉบบัปจัจุบนั ทัง้ๆทีใ่นประเทศ
ไทยก็มเีครื่องหมายการค้าที่มชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายเพิม่มากขึน้โดยเฉพาะเครื่องหมายการค้าของคน
ไทยเอง ดงันี้ บทความฉบบันี้  จงึเหน็ว่าสมควรแก่เวลาแล้วที่ประเทศไทยและพระราชบญัญตัิ
เครือ่งหมายการคา้ฉบบัปจัจบุนั จะไดร้บัการแกไ้ขเพื่อน าหลกัการใหค้วามคุม้เครื่องหมายการคา้
ที่มีชื่อเสียงแพร่หลายในกรณีที่ถูกท าให้เสื่อมเสียคุณค่า (Dilution) มาใช้ เพื่อส่งเสริมให้
ผูป้ระกอบการ โดยเฉพาะเจา้ของเครื่องหมายทีม่ชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายไดร้กัษาเครื่องหมายการค้า
ไวไ้ดเ้พื่อประโยชน์ทัง้แก่ผูป้ระกอบการชาวไทยและประเทศชาตใินทางเศรษฐกิจทีม่ ัน่คงต่อไป 
 
Introduction 
 
Trademark dilution is the legal theory which imposes liability against any person 
who undertakes an unauthorized use of a trademark that is identical with or similar to a 
famous mark in a way that would lessen the distinctive quality of such trademark.1 The 
                                                          
1Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L. 
Rev. 813 (1927) available at;www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/1330367; see also David S. 
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concept underlying the trademark dilution doctrine is based on the protection of 
producers, traders or manufacturers because under this doctrine, a trademark has been 
viewed as a valuable asset of the trademark owner. As the trademark owner has 
invested massive amounts of money and put considerable effort in making the mark 
highly distinctive and famous. The law seeks to prevent diminution in the value of a 
famous mark from the unauthorized uses of other marks, even when consumers are not 
confused as to the source of the goods or services. This is because the trademarks that 
are identical with or similar to the famous mark have been used in non-competing 
markets. Such use can diminish or dilute the mark’s selling power and distinctive value 
because the mark is no longer associated with a single source.2  
In Thailand, a well-known trademark has long been protected since promulgation 
of the Trademark Act B.E 2474. Although the 2474 Act also had no provision explicitly 
specifying the protection of well-known marks and although at that time Thailand was not 
a party to the Paris convention,3 if the owner of a well-known mark could show that his 
trademark had established reputation or fame among Thai general public consumers, his 
well-known trademark would be protected and he might seek civil liability against the 
unauthorized registration or unauthorized use even though the third party’s trademark 
was in different class. Besides, in practice, there are many dilution-like cases which the 
well-known marks are protected against trademark dilution by the determination by the 
court.  
However, although trademark dilution doctrine is an acknowledged theory among 
scholars and legal practitioners in the trademark field, such doctrine is not mentioned 
anywhere in Thai trademark law. The Thai Trademark Act only refuses trademark 
registrations in situations where the trademark is identical, or confusingly similar, to a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Welkowitz, Trademark Dilution: Federal, State, and International Law, The Bureau of 
National Affairs, Inc. 5, n. 8 (2009). 
2Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 Columbia L. Rev. 1035 (2006). 
3See นินนาท บุญยะเดช, การคุม้ครองเครือ่งหมายการคา้ทีม่ชีื่อเสยีงแพร่หลายทัว่ไปใน
ประ เทศไทยตามพันธกรณี ในกฎหมายระหว่ างประ เทศ , วิทยานิพนธ์นิ ติศ าสตร์
มหาบณัฑติ มหาวทิยาลยัธรรมศาสตร์, น. 67 - 73 (2552) (Ninnat Bunyadej, Protection of 
Well-known marks in Thailand: The Obligation under International Law, Thesis, 
Thammasat University 67 - 73 (2009)).  
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prior registered trademark or a well-known mark that is under a type of mark which is 
either similar or in a related class. In 1999, some practitioners brought the issue of the 
dilution doctrine before the court. However, the court was reluctant to acknowledge the 
dilution doctrine, as evidenced by the IP&IT Court’s judgment no. 72/2542 which states 
that “the dilution doctrine is a theory which views trademark laws as property rights. 
However, Thailand bases its trademark laws on confusion-based liability, and in addition, 
Thailand adopts a system of Civil Law. Therefore, it is not the duty of the court to 
implement this theory, which is a US federal law, but instead, it is the duty of the 
administrative sector.”  
Consequently, in the process of the amendment in year 2000, the amendment of 
the Thai Trademark Act in 2000 was not adopted to include the anti-dilution doctrine, but 
rather the administrative sector included protection of well-known mark in the Trademark 
Act and instead of including the principle of trademark dilution law. Thus, there is no 
provision which imposes civil liability for trademark dilution in Thailand. The language of 
the existing Trademark Act B.E. 2543 (as amended) is insufficient to deal with cases 
involving issues relating to dilution.  
Therefore, from the author’s perspective, it is an appropriate time for Thailand to 
amend and expand the scope of confusion-base liability by incorporating an anti-
trademark dilution provision in the Trademark Act, in order to protect the benefits of 
consumers, and to promote fair competition for traders and especially the owner's of 
famous/well-known marks in Thailand, by entitling them to impose civil liability against 
trademark dilution. 
 
2.  The Nature of Trademark Dilution 
 
2.1 The Origin of Trademark Dilution 
 Now a day, trademark or brand has become the most important tools, the 
business company use to communicate with consumer. Once the brand becomes 
famous and well known, it will generate huge sales volumes and profit. It is every 
trader’s ambition to be able to compete and gain market share in a large consumer 
market. However, in order to achieve this goal, they would have to spend a lot of time 
and money creating such a well-known, famous and strong brand. To make a strong 
brand require hard work, times and money as to build the strong brand, the business 
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company has to build its consumer. The strong brand is the one that have quality which 
draw attention to consumer and contain sale power in its appearance.     
 For example, in order to be successful in their business, create reputation, 
and finally become a well known or famous mark in the global market today, traders 
have to use many marketing strategies in order to compete with other brands that 
already exist in the market. Some build their brand by maintaining the good quality of 
their products, while others may use and rely on a  supporting marketing program and 
integrate the brand through, for example, the use of advertisements.  
 However, these strategies will consume a significant amount of time and 
money. Some brands use number of years before consumers become associated and 
loyal to the brand, such as Coca-Cola, MAMA, MK restaurant, S&P, etc.4 
 Consequently, some traders wish to gain benefits in the general public 
market, but do not want to spend time, or invest massive amounts of money. These 
traders are crafty enough to know about gaps in the law, and create ways which allow 
them to cash in from using an association with other entities that are already famous, or 
use other associations which are indirectly transferred to their brand. This strategy is 
called as ‘me-too’ marketing. In the case of dilution, some traders use the me-too 
strategy for non-competing markets, in order to enter their chosen market by using gaps 
in traditional trademark laws, which therefore leads to unfair competition. The court in 
L’Oreal SA v. Bellure,5 viewed this kind of free-riding activity as “a wink of an eye to 
existing branded products to make it sell easily for those who recognize it.” 
 During and before the 19th century, a court often determined confusion only 
when a junior trademark, which was similar or identical to a senior trade mark, was 
authorized to be used in a competing market, by holding that infringement could only 
                                                          
4See Being MAMA brand today, http://www.utcc.issariyapat.com/ sites/default/files/ 
SEMINAR_ GURU _2.pdf; see also สูตรป ัน้แบรนด์ไทยตดิตลาดโลกโกยพนัล้านธุรกจิ
รา้นอาหารเครอื S&P (Strategy make Thai brand gain billion income from the perspective 
of restaurant business with S & P), http://www. manager.co.th/mgr Weekly / View News 
.aspx?NewsID=9540000127733 (last visited Feb. 28th , 2013). 
5L’Oreal SA v. Bellure [2007] EWCA Civ 968; [2008] RPC 9. 
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occur when the plaintiffs and defendant's goods or services competed in the same 
market.6  
 However, due to economic developments, producers not only focused on 
their brand marketing, but also began to diversify their market into multiple products 
lines. Some even began to expand their business by giving licenses to, or sponsoring, 
other affiliations to manufacture their products. This economic expansion has also 
expanded the perspective of legal protection.7     
 Therefore, after the decision in the Kodak Case in 18888, the court and 
scholars seem to find a way to interpret and develop more extensions to traditional 
trademark law. Lukens9 advocated that:  
 “as firms began to diversify into multiple product lines, it becomes increasingly 
important to be able to protect existing marks for future use in new product markets. To do 
this, a firm had to be able to stop others from using its mark in the new market before it 
entered, and this necessitated extending Trademark protection to Non-competing goods” 
On the one hand, the scholars and courts developed the expansion of confusion-
based liability itself so that it had a broader scope, such as the theory of confusion of 
sponsorship, or confusion of association. Modern courts require that goods be "related", 
although not necessarily competing, in order to constitute a trademark infringement. 
When products appear to be unrelated, courts may turn to the concept of sponsorship 
                                                          
6Thomas J. McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 24:2 
(4th ed. 1996); (Robert G. Bone, Schechter’s Ideas in Historical Context and Dilution’s 
Rocky Road, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J., n. 61 (2008)). 
7Elson Kaseke, Trademark Dilution: A Comparative Analysis, Ph.D. Thesis (Law), 
University of South Africa, 41, n. 33-34 (2006). 
8Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v. John Griffith’s Cycle Corp., 15 R.P.C. 
105, 110 (1898). 
9Edward C. Lukens, The Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to 
Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. Rev. 197, 204-205 (1927). 
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confusion.10 However, on the other hand, the dilution theory has been adopted in many 
statutes and decisions during the 19th century.11  
For instance, the US congress has adopted and specified a policy of trademark 
dilution whereby: “the concept of Dilution recognizes the substantial investment, the owner 
has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting 
both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain” 12 
Accordingly, traditional trademark law on confusion-based liability aims to ensure 
consumer protection, and the protection of the quality of information transmitted to 
consumers. On the other hand, the concept of dilution-based liability has been 
developed in order to protect trademarks as a property right, by securing an investment 
from the trademark owner to establish and promote such strong mark.13 
Thus, for traders, traditional trademark law will not cover this action because 
trademark dilution, by way of blurring and tarnishment, will generally be used by a junior 
in non-competing goods or services, and traditional trademark law views such action as 
non-confusing use, or use in non-competing goods which does not cause consumer 
confusion as to the source of the goods, because the junior trademark is used to infringe 
a trademark in a non-competing market.  
Traditional trademark laws aim to protect trademarks from infringement, or being 
passed off, through confusion-based liability, particularly in cases where consumers have 
been misled, or confusion has arisen, as to the sources or origins of the goods or 
services, in order to protect the quality of the information transmitted to consumers.14  
                                                          
10McCarthy, supra note 6, § 24:7 (Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search 
Costs, and Naked Licensing, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1761, n.7 (2006)). 
11See INTA, The Dilution Debate, The Global Analysis of Dilution (2008), 
http://static.informaprofessional .com/ipwo/images/supplements/INTA_May08.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 11th, 2011). 
12H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1030. 
13Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 1839-1847 (2007). 
14Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark law, 86 B.U.L. Rev. 548, 558 (2006). 
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Traditional trademark laws only permit trademark holders’ protection to the extent 
that consumers are actually, or likely to become, confused. The law provides a confusion 
test to determine whether the use of a similar or identical trademark, when applied to 
specific goods or services, could be confused with another mark that is used for the 
same or a related type of goods or services.  
Because of the free market system in existence today, consumers can easily 
shift to a competitor’s products or brands.  Therefore, almost every company will invest 
huge sums of money in brand advertisements, improving their product quality, building 
strong brands by communicating positive and unique brand identities to consumers15, or 
even adjusting their products’ trade dress and trademark because the more distinctive 
and famous the trademarks, the more powerful the brand will become, and thus, the 
more the trademark can gain in terms of consumers association and brand royalties, a 
dynamic Frank Schechter viewed as being “the selling power of the mark”.16  
In Schechter’s view, the true functions of a trademark is to identify the product as 
being satisfactory, thereby stimulating further purchases by the consuming public.17 The 
changing of the economic system, coupled with extensive reliance on advertising, has 
transformed a trademark from “a symbol of good will, to an agent for the actual creation 
and perpetuation of good will.” Hence, a trademark is not simply the source indicator or 
symbol of good will of the trader, but the trademark actually sells the goods. In 1927, 
Schechter advocated in his research article “The Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection18 that:  
“the real function of a trademark is to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby 
stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.”19   
                                                          
15Barbara Loken, Rohini Ahluwalia, & Micheal J. Houston, Brands and Brand 
Management, 233 (2010). 
16Frank I. Schechter, Trade Morals and Regulation: The American Scene, 6 
Fordham L. Rev. 190, 204 n. 42 (1937). 
17Frank I. Schechter, The Historical Foundations of the Law Relating to 
Trademark, 19 – 145 (1925), http://www.jstor.org/pss/1330367. 
18Welkowitz, supra note 1, at n. 8. 
19Id. 
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In Schechter’s idea, the real injury to a trademark is “the gradual whittling away 
or dispersion of its identity”, and therefore preservation of this uniqueness of a trademark 
should be the only rational basis for the protection of a Trademark, Later on, this cause 
of action became known as Dilution by Blurring.20 
Accordingly, traditional trademark law will view that such non-confusing use can 
create severe problem to both consumers and traders in a similar manner to the harm 
caused by infringement. On the other hand, if a junior trademark tarnishes or uses a 
trademark that is identical, or similar, to the senior well-known trademark in a competing 
market, and causes negative attitudes toward the senior brand in minds of the 
consumers, then the senior trademark still has legal protection under traditional 
trademark law. However, for trademark dilution cases where the junior trademark uses a 
similar or identical trademark for non-competing goods, the law needs to expand the 
scope of protection to include non-competing goods, in order to cover trademark dilution 
in practice.    
Hence, from a legal standpoint, trademark dilution creates severe problems for 
trader, as they suffer from unfair competition or free ride on the senior trademark 
reputation because trademark dilution widens the gap with regard to traditional 
trademark law, both with respect to either passing off or infringement, because both of 
them base their determination of protection for well-known mark on confusion-based 
liability, whereas there is no consumer confusion in trademark dilution cases. Therefore, 
if the laws do not advance in line with the pace of current economic advancement, the 
traders, and especially with respect to owners of famous marks, will gradually lose legal 
protection for their trademark which they have put so many efforts to create. 
 
2.2  Types of Dilution 
 2.2.1  Dilution by Blurring 
   Blurring is derived from Schechter’s proposal, which is the reduction in a 
mark's "selling power" or "advertising value", or the "whittling away" of a mark's 
distinctiveness, which weakens the distinctive quality of a famous mark. This is the 
traditional notion of dilution i.e. the use of an identical or virtually identical mark on 
goods or services that may be completely different and unrelated to the plaintiff’s 
                                                          
20Id. 
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products or services. The belief is that a mark that is highly similar or identical to the 
plaintiff’s unique, distinctive and well-known mark can detract from consumers’ strong 
association of the plaintiff’s mark with the plaintiff’s goods and services, thereby 
lessening the strength or value of the plaintiff’s mark as an identifier of its goods or 
services. 
 
 2.2.2  Dilution by Tarnishment 
   A claim for trademark dilution by tarnishment occurs when the 
unauthorized use of a trademark for goods of an inferior, immoral or unwholesome 
character, or in an unwholesome, offensive or degrading context, may tarnish the 
reputation of the trademark. In this situation, the trademark’s reputation diminishes when 
the public attributes the undesirable characteristics of the defendant’s goods to the 
plaintiff’s goods. In contrast to blurring, tarnishment has not originated from Schechter’s 
formulation of trademark dilution. Tarnishment is referred to as the unauthorized use of a 
trademark that portrays the famous mark in a way that creates negative associations, 
undesirable, un-wholesome, or unsavory mental associations, and results in damage to 
the reputation of a famous mark. Tarnishment usually weakens the famous mark through 
inappropriate or unflattering associations, or through the use of a similar mark, or term 
that plays on one’s mark, which may be associated with sexual or offensive content, and 
which have subject matter that is contrary to, or critical of, the mark owner and its beliefs 
or philosophies, in order to lead customers of the mark owner to directly criticize, or 
attack, the mark owner or their products/services. 
 
3. Protection of Well-known Mark against Trademark Dilution under International 
Trademark Law and in Foreign Countries 
 
 3.1 Protection of Well-known Mark against Trademark Dilution under 
International Trademark Law 
  Under the international standard, the Paris Convention is the basic source 
of international protection for all forms of intellectual property, including trademarks. 
Many countries protect well-known or famous marks in accordance with their 
international obligations under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1883) as amended in article 6bis of the Paris Convention provides additional 
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protection for well-known marks. Including, the Agreements on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement provisions which diverge from those 
contained in the Paris Convention.21 The TRIPS Agreement provides extension of 
protection of well known trademark to service marks in Article 16.2; and the protection 
against Dilution in Article 16.322. 
  The TRIPS Agreement introduces a significant change in the traditional 
protection of a well-known mark, as Article 16.3 does not require similarity and provides 
protection that extends beyond the normal protection under the principle of specialty, as 
it stated that:  
  “Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
goods or services which are not similar to those in the respect of which a trademark is 
registered, provided that use of that trademark in relation to those goods or services would 
indicate a connection between those goods or services and the owner of the registered 
trademark, and provided that the interest of the owner of the registered trademark are 
likely to be damaged by such use.” 
  Article 16.3 provides protection under Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention, 
and is applicable to goods and services which are not similar to those in respect of 
which a trademark is registered on two conditions:  
  (i) the use of the allegedly infringing mark, in relation to those other goods 
or services, would indicate a connection between those other goods or services and the 
owner of the famous mark; and 
  (ii) the interests of the owner of the famous mark are likely to be damaged 
by such use.  
  According to the first condition above, Article 16.3 deals with the protection 
of well-known mark which is beyond the scope of consumer confusion, because the 
article extends to a likelihood of association.  
  As Carvalho23 mentioned in his book, Article 16.3 protects well-known 
marks against parasitic behavior in the sense that other traders may wish to gain from 
                                                          
21Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Trademarks and Designs, 
Kluwer Law International, 138 (2d ed. 2010). 
22Id. at 139 
23Carvalho, supra note 21, at 375-376. 
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the notoriety that a well-known trademark has acquired in connection with certain 
products or services, in order to commercialize dissimilar products or services. Well-
known marks must be protected against their generalized use, even if for dissimilar 
products or services, that is, even if there is no likelihood of creating confusion that may 
lead consumers to buy products or services they did not wish to buy. The reason is that 
the generalized use of a mark may cause the strength of that mark to be “diluted,” that 
is, to be weakened. 
  Hence, Article 16.3 would arguably embody the trademark dilution doctrine, 
because this Article also expands its protection to cover dissimilar goods, and it does not 
require confusion or likelihood of confusion.  Instead, Article 16.3 is triggered by the 
indication of a connection between the goods or services designated by a trademark and 
the owner of the well-known trademark. However, the concept of protecting well-
know/famous marks against dilution is still not well defined, and this has resulted in 
difficulties in reading and interpreting Article 16.3 as; 
  (i) it is difficult to argue whether Article 16.3 is unequivocally an anti-dilution 
measure.24  
  According to Gervais’s perspective,25 Article 16.3 require consumers to be 
protected against the confusing use of a well-known marks, in relation to dissimilar 
goods, and therefore, the owner of such mark shall be afforded anti-dilution rights that 
do not depend on consumer confusion. However, Article 16.3 still requires that, as a 
minimum standard, parties basing liability for a defendant’s use of a well-known mark on 
dissimilar goods or services, must find such connection with the trademark.  
  In Carvalho’s perspective, the purpose of Article 16.3 is to avoid confusion 
between trademarks with a well-known mark, rather than confusion with products or 
services, as under Article 6 bis of the Paris Convention. Although, Article 16.3 dose not 
clearly require parties to afford specific anti-dilution protection, nonetheless, this Article 
could be considered to be affording an anti-dilution provision, and may provide even 
higher protection than an anti-dilution provision because Article 16.3 is related to 
                                                          
24Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting History and Analysis, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 174 (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added). (“Article 16.3 protects against 
dilution “even in cases where there is no likelihood of confusion.”). 
25Id. 
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protection of the reputation and capture of prestige, rather than distinctiveness in respect 
to the dilution doctrine, and even where the use of the well-known mark associated with 
dissimilar goods or services does not put the distinctive capacity of the trademark at risk, 
Article 16.3 is still applicable.26 
  (ii) Although Article 16.3 requires parties to protect ‘well-known’ trademarks, 
it does not mandate anti-dilution protection. 
  This topic is controversial because the TRIPS Agreement is not well 
defined as to whether it obliges WTO members to provide anti-dilution protection in 
accordance with Article 16.3, and whether this is a different issue from what Art.16.3 
requires as a minimum standard of protection. There are some countries which have 
interpreted it to mean that they must comply, and that it surpasses its TRIPS obligations 
to adopt a dilution doctrine in their domestic law, such as Australia27, Vietnam28, Japan29 
and US. However, other countries have interpreted Article16.3 to mean that it does not 
require parties to afford specific anti-dilution protection in their domestic law, but they are 
still implementing the dilution doctrine in their domestic trademark law, such as 
Singapore, UK and the European Union member countries, which implemented the 
doctrine under the EC Trade Marks Directive.  
 
                                                          
26Carvalho, supra note 21, at 337. 
27Michael Handler, Trademark Dilution in Australia?, University of New South 
Wales Faculty of Law Research Series (2008) available at; http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1398622. 
28Pham Hong Quat, “The development of the national law on protection of well-
know trademarks in Vietnam”,http://iprenforcement.most.gov.vn/ckfinder/userfiles/ files/ 
The%20deverlopment%20of%20the%20national%20law%20on%20protection%20of%20 
well-know%20 trademarks%20in%20Viet% 20nam(2).pdf. 
29Hà Thi Nguyet Thu, “Well-Known Trademark Protection Reference to the 
Japanese experience”, WIPO Six Month Study- CUM - Research Fellowship 2010, 
available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ about-wipo/en/offices/ japan/research/ 
pdf/vietnam_ 2010.pdf; see also Mingde Li, Well-Known Trademark Protection: A 
Comparative Study between Japan and China, http://www.iip.or.jp/e/esummary/pdf/ 
detail2006/e18_18.pdf. (last visited Dec. 25th, 2012) 
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 3.2  Protection of Well-known Mark against Trademark Dilution in the US 
  In the US, the anti-dilution law was first established under state statutes, 
under which many states have different perspectives of protection and thus, implement 
different scopes for such anti-dilution law. Later, in 1995, the US Congress passed the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition which recognizes dilution as a doctrine of 
trademark protection.30  
 Trademark dilution under unfair competition law in the US is stipulated under the 
Restatement (Third) of unfair competition. The Restatement recognizes dilution as a 
branch of an unfair competition action. However, it should be noted that by virtue of this 
Section,31 the Restatement permits anti-dilution protection only when there is a statute 
                                                          
30Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 5. 
31US Restatements(Third)  of Unfair Competition (1995) § 25:   
[ L]iability without Proof of Confusion: Dilution and Tarnishment” as follows:  
(1) One may be subject to liability under the law of 
trademarks for the use of a designation that resembles the trademark, trade 
name, collective mark, or certification mark of another without proof of a 
likelihood of confusion only under an applicable anti-dilution statute. An actor is 
subject to liability under an anti-dilution statute if the actor uses such a 
designation in a manner that is likely to associate the other's mark with the 
goods, services, or business of the actor and: 
(a) The other's mark is highly distinctive and the association 
of the mark with the actor's goods, services, or business is likely to cause a 
reduction in that distinctiveness; or 
(b) The association of the other's mark with the actor's goods, 
services, or  
business, or the nature of the actor's use, is likely to disparage the other's 
goods, services, or business or tarnish the images associated with the other's 
mark. 
(2) One who uses a designation that resembles the trademark, 
trade name, collective mark, or certification mark of another, not in a manner that 
is likely to associate the other's mark with the goods, services, or business of the 
actor, but rather to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage the other 
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that provides for such protection. Hence, the later Federal Trademark Act also includes a 
trademark dilution provision as a branch of an unfair competition action. 
 In 1995, the US Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 32 
which set forth the basis of the trademark dilution doctrine by amending Section 43 of 
the Trademark Act 1946 (Lanham Act).’33 The purpose of implementing the FTDA was to 
expand the scope of protection for famous marks, by creating a federal cause of action 
against those who make commercial use of a famous trademark in such a manner that 
it dilutes the distinctive quality of the mark, even in the cases where there is no 
likelihood of confusion, in order to meet its international obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement.34 
 Accordingly, Section 43 (c), 15U.S.C. § 1125 (c) states that:  
 ‘‘(1) the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of 
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against 
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use 
begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality 
of the mark,” 
 In addition, in order to understand what constitutes dilution, the Lanham Act 
Section 45, 15 U.S.C § 112735 defines the dilution cause of action as follows:  
                                                                                                                                                                       
or the other's goods, services, business, or mark, is subject to liability without 
proof of a likelihood of confusion only if the actor's conduct meets the 
requirements of a cause of action for defamation, invasion of privacy, or injurious 
falsehood. 
32Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98 (1996)(codified at 
15 U.S.C §1125 (c)(Supp. V 1999). 
33http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm#2) (last visited 
Feb. 22d, 2012). 
34Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 Enrolled BILLS 104 H.R. 1295 Enr. 
3515 U.S.C § 1127:  
[T] he owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the 
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or 
trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes 
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 “the term ‘dilution’ means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of; 
1. competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties; or 
2. likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception” 
Hence, under the FTDA, in order to impose civil liability against a cause of action  
relating to trademark dilution, a plaintiff must show the following: 36 
i. Its trademark is famous; 
ii. The defendant is making commercial use of its trademark; 
iii. What usage started after the plaintiff’s mark became famous; and 
iv.  What caused the ‘dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the plaintiff’s mark. 
 However, the trademark dilution doctrine in the US is very new compared to 
other causes of action. At first, the judges and legal practitioners seemed to be reluctant 
to use such doctrine, because of the unclear provisions of the FTDA, and some judges 
preferred to rely on traditional trademark grounds. Due to the controversial arose among 
several federal circuit courts over the proper interpretation of the FTDA’s requirement for 
the owner of a trademark who seeks liability under a dilution claim, due to the actual 
language of the FTDA which requires that a court consider the language of the statute in 
relation to the following provision: “causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the famous 
mark.”37 Some circuit courts interpreted this provision to mean that it only requires the 
likelihood of dilution, while other courts interpreted it to mean that it requires actual 
                                                                                                                                                                       
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is 
provided in this subsection… 
The Term “Dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a 
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the 
presence or absence of… 
(1) Competition between the owner of the famous mark and other 
parties, or  Likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception. 
36Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998) 
37See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, 
1 (W.D. Ky. Feb 9, 2000). 
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dilution. Later, the law has improved in accordance with the problems which have arisen 
in practice in respect to the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA).38  
 Accordingly, the TDRA amended the Trademark Act of 1946 by revising 
provisions relating to trademark dilution. The law entitles the owner of a famous mark 
that is distinctive to an injunction against another person who commences commercial 
use of a mark or trade name, after it has become famous, in a manner that is likely to 
cause dilution by blurring or tarnishment, regardless of the presence or absence of 
actual or likely confusion, competition, or actual economic injury.  
 Besides, incorporating a new provision for a dilution defense as ‘fair use’, and 
other factors proving dilution claim, which will be discussed later in this thesis, the TDRA 
has also made significant changes from the previous FTDA, and intends to clarify the 
following controversial areas: 
a. The TDRA expressly defines two types of dilution;  
  Prior to the enactment of the TDRA, some courts held that the only 
actionable dilution was dilution by blurring. Thus, dilution by tarnishment was not 
actionable. The TDRA provides that both dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment 
are actionable, as it divides dilution into two distinctive categories, as follows: 
  (1) Dilution by blurring 
   Dilution by Blurring refers to the classical action proposed by Schechter 
as “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of its identity.” Under Section 43(c)39 of the 
TDRA, dilution by blurring means  
   “An association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name 
and a famous mark” 
  (2) Dilution by tarnishment 
   Dilution by tarnishment is defined under Section 43(c)40 of the TDRA as 
“an association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark, that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”  
                                                          
38Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, § 2, 120 
Stat.1730 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) (as enacted by the senate on March 8, 
2006), http://www. govtrack.us/congress/bills/109 /hr683/text ( last visited Feb. 15th, 
2012). 
3915 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (1). 
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   Accordingly, the court in Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs,41 noted that:  
   “while Blurring is mainly concerned with the protection of a famous 
trademark’s distinctiveness characteristics, tarnishment is mainly concerned with the 
reputational aspect of the owners not wanting  their famous trademarks to be associated 
with something that is considered unwholesome”. 
 b. The TDRA disqualifies the niche fame standard, and requires famous marks to 
be widely recognized by the general consuming public, in order to constitute a famous 
mark under this Act.42 
 c. The TDRA protects famous marks that are distinctive, regardless of whether 
such distinctiveness is “inherent” or if it has been acquired”, in order to assert a dilution 
claim. 
 d. The TDRA require proof that there is a ‘likelihood of dilution’, in order to 
pursue a dilution claim. 
 The TDRA clearly states that only a likelihood of dilution need be shown in order 
to obtain relief. This is intended to provide a means for trademark owners to stop dilution 
at the outset, rather than making owners wait until actual harm has been incurred to the 
distinctive nature of the mark.43 After the US Congress had passed the TDRA, this Act 
made a huge change to the Moseley case. Since actual dilution does not need to be 
proved under the TDRA, the owner of a famous mark is entitled to obtain an injunction 
against another person who uses a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to 
cause dilution of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or 
likely confusion, competition, or actual economic injury.44  Subsequently, the Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision, and found that there was a 
likelihood of dilution.45 
                                                                                                                                                                       
4015 U.S.C. § 1125 (c) (2) (c). 
41Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
42Lanham Act, Sec. 43 (c) (2) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2) (A). 
43Dale M. Cendali and Bonnie L. Schriefer, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006: A Welcome and Needed Change, 105:108 Michigan L. Rev. 109 (2006).  
44Id. 
45V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d.734, 750 (W.D. Ky. 
2008). 
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 However, from the author’s perspective, the expansion of confusion-based 
liability to incorporate a wider scope of sponsorship or associated confusion, has led to 
serious discussions amongst scholars today with respect to the ambiguous 
understanding between “confusion of sponsorship or association” and “dilution by 
blurring”. 
 Besides, the consequences of recent globalization in the Internet era make legal 
protection of trademarks even more complicated, particularly in cases when a third 
person has embarked on the unauthorized use of a mark that is similar to or identical 
with another party’s trademark, especially in cases where such mark is a famous mark, 
for their domain name or for use on the internet. Traditional trademark laws on 
confusion-based liability do not cover this type of protection. Some jurisdictions which 
strongly rely on confusion-based liability, have sought to expand the scope of protection 
for the trademark owner under confusion-based liability, by establishing post-sale 
confusion and initial interest confusion, which view the quality of a trademark as a 
property right.46 Initial interest confusion is a form of trademark confusion whereby 
confusion does not take place at the time of sale, when the consumer becomes 
interested and does in fact purchase a competing product based on confusion which 
exists only during the period when they initially locate the competing product.47 
 For example, in the Playboy Case48, Playboy sued Netscape and Excite based 
on the grounds that they sold keywords, including “Playboy” and “Playmate”, which are 
both trademarks belonging to Playboy, to advertisers. Thereafter, when people entered 
these trademarks keywords, banner ads would pop up showing adult 
advertisements.  The US Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that when the banner 
advertisement was displayed, without identifying the source, such action on the part of 
                                                          
46Bone, supra note 14, at 552, n. 10. 
47Michael J. Feigin, Collision: Initial Interest Confusion and the Internet, 5 (2006), 
http://patentlawnj.com/ uploads /feigin.us-InitialInterestConfusion.pdf. (last visited May 
12th, 2013) 
48Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
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the search engine could be deemed a trademark infringement under the theory of “initial 
interest confusion”, as well as possibly being a dilution of Playboy’s trademarks.49 
 In many cases, the dilution claim was filed together with a confusion-based 
liability claim and other actions like unfair competition and passing off. Thereby, the court 
must determine all causes of action to ascertain whether these fit the case. This has 
caused a problem, as some courts tend to mix up the measurement of confusion base 
with the dilution base.50 This issue has remained controversial among scholars. Many 
scholars51 viewed this phenomenon as a misunderstanding and a misuse of the dilution 
doctrine, because originally, Schechter’s aim for proposing his dilution theory as a 
general theory of trademark liability that was superior to the confusion theory was not as 
simple as another type of harm, or just another doctrine to supplement the existing 
confusion-based liability rule. Professor McCarthy views this phenomenon as “the parallel 
expansion”52, and he believes that traditional trademark law and anti-dilution law should 
not be mixed up together.53In McCarthy’s view, a mark that confuses does not 
necessarily dilute because the very fact of calling to mind may indicate that the mind is 
distinguishing between, rather than being confused by, the two marks.  
 McCarthy argued in his article54 that, to apply dilution in the case of competing 
litigants is a dangerous misuse of the dilution doctrine, and it is bound to result in harm 
to the balance of free and fair competition. McCarthy believes that the concept of 
trademark dilution was specifically initiated to create more protection in the form of a 
                                                          
49Feigin, supra note 47, n. 6. 
50Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., Nabisco, Inc, v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F. 3d 
1882, 1890 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We believe that Dilution can occur where the junior mark’s 
use competes directly with the senior’s as well as where the junior mark’s use is in non-
competing market. A junior use that confuses consumers as to which mark is which 
surely dilutes the distinctiveness of the senior mark.”). 
51See Thomas J. McCarthy, Proving a Trademark Has Been Diluted: Theories or 
Facts?, 41 Houston L. Rev. (2004) ; see also Bone, supra note 14, at  477 n. 46. 
52Thomas J. McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European and United States 
Law Compared, 94 Trademark Rep. 1163, 1171 (2004). 
53Id. at 1170-1172. 
54McCarthy, supra note 6, § 24:90. 
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special and extraordinary remedy for strong and famous marks.55 However, this extra 
protection was limited to situations where even an expansive version of the traditional 
confusion test would not be successful. 
 The anti-dilution laws should only be rarely, and guardedly, applied to cases 
involving parties who sell in the same market, because the anti-dilution theory was not 
designed, or conceived, to apply to such cases, and thus it makes a poor fit. It is the 
wrong tool for the job. Its misuse in competitive situations is bound to upset the balance 
of free and fair competition and to deform the anti-dilution doctrine.56 
 Consequently, some scholars57 believe that the dilution doctrine is unnatural, and 
it gives a quasi-monopoly to the trademark holder. For example, Professor 
Handler58viewed dilution as “an attempt to fasten on the American people a new species 
of monopoly. The air would have been filled with cries that a monopoly of language would 
result in a monopoly of product.” 
 Hence, dilution is, and should be, a separate legal theory positing a different kind 
of damage to a mark caused by a different form of consumer perception. Any attempt to 
weld the two doctrines together is bound to result in error and bafflement. As stated, 
“dilution by blurring and infringement by a likelihood of confusion are not stops along the 
same railway line: they are different lines altogether. They are separate lines because 
they are separate kinds of consumer perception.”59 
 From the author’s perspective, each job uses different tools, and thus, each type 
of case should be determined under each specific set of rules. Although the Thai 
administration has found no problems in using confusion-based liability in our trademark 
law, and may view that trademark dilution gives too much protection to the producers or 
the owners of famous marks, in the future, as ubiquitous use of computers continues 
                                                          
55Id. 
56Id. 
57Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution by Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of 
Trademark Infringement, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 1830, n.20 (2000).  
58Milton Handler, Are the State Anti-dilution Laws Compatible with the National 
Protection of Trademarks, 75 Trademark Rep. 269 (1985) (The Dilution Debate, supra 
note 21, at 16 n. 17).  
59Id. 
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unabated, dilution-like cases, especially in respect to domain names, will increase. This 
in turn will open the door to infringers to freely use these openings to free ride on the 
famous mark’s reputation.  
 In this case, consumers will never be harmed, because dilution-like cases deal 
with marketing and brand association, and of course, no confusion about the source or 
origin of the goods will arise, as each of the parties represents his/her own brand. The 
difference of course is that the owner of the famous mark has invested massive amounts 
of money on advertisement for many years, in order to create a brand which consumers 
can remember, and which testifies to the quality of the products or services, so that 
consumers can select the brand without worry (minimizing search costs).  
 In contrast, the junior user can freely cash in on using a trademark that is 
identical with or similar to the famous mark, which is similar enough to lead to 
associations being made with the famous mark’s brand loyalty. Thus, the product which 
bears such mark, can be used on the market without having to spend such massive 
amounts on advertising and marketing. 
 In conclusion, the protection of marks from dilution differs from the protection in 
traditional trademark infringements. Dilution does not rely on the standard test of 
infringement, i.e. the likelihood of confusion, deception or a mistake. While traditional 
trademark infringement was squarely aimed at preventing consumer confusion, dilution 
action targets unauthorized use that threatens to diminish, or lessen, the distinctiveness 
of a trademark.60 
                                                          
60Shubha Ghost, Dilution and Competition Norms: The Case of Federal 
Trademark Dilution Claims Against Direct Competitors, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High 
Tech. L.J. 590 (2008); see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling 
Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. Rev. 789, 843 
(1997) (“Dilution law, unlike traditional trademark infringement law…is not based on a 
likelihood of confusion standard, but only exist to protect the quasi-property rights a 
holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.”); see also Shari 
Seidman Diamond, Trademark Dilution: of Fame, Blurring, and Sealing Wax, with a 
Touch of Judicial Wisdom, 24 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 523 (2008) 
(“The traditional core justification for trademark protection is consumer protection…in 
contrast, by granting the trademark owner a right to bring an action for dilution, the law 
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4.  Protection of Well-known Mark against Trademark Dilution in Thailand 
 According to the general principle of Thai trademark law, the rights of the 
trademark owner are restricted to the categories of goods and services for which the 
trademark has been registered. However, in practice, there have been many dilution-like 
cases which have appeared in Thai courts under the field of well-known marks.  
 The dilution-like cases which appeared in Thailand have comprised the following 
characteristics: 
a) The plaintiff is the owner of a well-known mark; 
b) The defendant is not authorized to use/register the trademark, which is  
identical/similar to the plaintiff’s mark; 
c) For different types (dissimilar/non-competing) of goods or services which  
the plaintiff has not registered.  
 However, in practice, a well-known trademark has long been protected since the 
promulgation of the Trademark Act B.E 2474. Although the 2474 Act also had no 
provision explicitly specifying the protection of well-known marks and although at that 
time Thailand was not a party to the Paris convention,61 if the owner of a well-known 
mark could show that his trademark had established reputation or fame among Thai 
general public consumers, his well-known trademark would be protected and he might 
seek civil liability against the unauthorized registration or unauthorized use even though 
the third party’s trademark was in different class.    
 For example, in the trademark committee decision no. 311/2528, the trademark 
committee declined the registration of trademark “DARKIE” for class 39 because such 
trademark is identical to well-known trademark “DARKIE” registered for class 48 
(toothpaste). 
 In the trademark committee decision no. 63/2526, the trademark committee 
declined the registration of trademark “SEIKO” for class 49 because such trademark is 
identical to the well-known trademark “SEIKO” registered for class 6, 8, 10, 12 and 45.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
recognizes a property right in the mark, enabling the trademark owner to erect a no 
trespass sign on a mark even if consumer are not likely to be confused as to source.”); 
see also Sarah M. Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A Proposal for Protecting Publicity Rights, 
21 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 347, 354 (2005). 
61Boonyadech, supra note 3, at 67 – 73.  
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 For example, in ‘ROLEX v. Lolex’62, the Plaintiff registered the trademark for 
category 10 “clocks or watches” in Thailand in B.E. 2494(1951). The plaintiff’s trademark 
is a five-apex crown, each of which is under a black circle. Underneath the crown lies 
the word “ROLEX.” The Defendant registered its trademark for category 39 “pencils” in 
B.E. 2524 (A.D.1981), and thereafter for all items in category 39 in B.E. 2526(A.D.1983). 
The Defendant’s trademark also comprises a five-apex crown, each of which is under a 
black circle with the word “Lolex” inscribed underneath. The Supreme Court ruled in 
favor of the Plaintiff on account of the aforementioned facts that the Defendant’s 
trademark not only looks very similar, but also shares a similar pronunciation with the 
Plaintiff’s mark.  
 Although the Defendant registered its trademark in a different category from the 
Plaintiff’s, it can be considered that the Defendant’s act can mislead the public into 
believing that its products are produced by the Plaintiff. Regardless of the fact that the 
Defendant has yet to produce the products under the trademark for sales, the 
registration of the trademark by the Defendant is considered to be an exercise of rights 
with dishonest intent. 
 The current Trademark Act (No.2) B.E. 2543  
 Similar to the Trademark Act B.E. 2474, the protection of well-known marks 
under the current Thai Trademark Act (No.2) B.E. 2543, are available for well-known 
trademarks;  
a. Registrations Bar under Section 8(10)63of the Trademark Act B.E. 2534, as  
Amended by the Trademark Act (No.2) B.E. 2543  
b. Protection Provision against Unauthorized Use. 
 However, It can be noted that according to the current Thai Trademark Act 
(No.2) B.E. 2543, the purposes of the law in Section 8(10) is to protect the rights of well-
known marks by empowering the registrar or trademark committee to cancel or refuse 
                                                          
62Supreme Court Decision No. 926/2539. 
63Sec. 8 (11) (1) of the Trademark Act B. E. 2534 or sec. 8(10) of the Trademark 
Act. B.E. 2534 as amended in 2543: “A mark, regardless of whether it is registered or 
not, which is identical to a well-known mark as prescribed by the Ministerial Notifications, 
or which is so similar that the public might be confused as to the owner or origin of the 
goods;”. 
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the registration of other trademarks which are similar or identical to the well-known 
marks. However, the law does not empower the owner of trademark himself to bar 
registration. The owner of a registered well-known mark, therefore, must rely on 
infringement under Section 4464 which entitles the owner of a registered trademark to 
exclusively use the trademark for goods for which it is registered and can exclude any 
person which uses a trademark that is similar, or identical to the registered trademark.65  
 The law does not provide the scope, or specify what type of ‘use’ is deemed to 
constitute an infringement. Besides, an action which constitutes a use that would be 
deemed to cause the harm to well-known marks appears in various laws. There is no 
specific law providing the scope, or specifying what type of ‘use’ is deemed to constitute 
an infringement or harm. In practice, the plaintiff may bring a civil claim of the 
unauthorized use as follows; 
 a. Passing off under Section 46 paragraph 2 
 b. Use of a similar or identical trademark for a name or trade name under 
Section 18 of the Civil and Commercial Code; 
 c. Unauthorized use/dishonest intent according to Sections 5, 420 and 421 of the 
Civil and Commercial Code 
 For example in ‘VICTORIA’S SECRET’66, a claim was brought to the court under 
Section 18 of the Civil and Commercial Code which grants ‘the right to the name of a 
person’, whereby a person who owns a name or trade name may request the court to 
prohibit the use of his name only when the use of such name or trade name would 
cause damage, or it is understood that the damage would continue.  
 In INTEL v. INTEL Lip,67 the issue of a well-known mark was raised, as the IP&IT 
court ruled that the Plaintiff’s trademark was not a ‘well-known’ mark in Thailand and 
thus, the use of the Defendant’s trademark ‘INTEL Lip’ for cosmetics did not infringe the 
Plaintiff’s trademark ‘INTEL’, which was used for computers. The Supreme Court was 
                                                          
64Section 44: “Subject to Sections 27 and 68, a person who is registered as the 
owner of a trademark shall have the exclusive right to use it for the goods for which it is 
registered.” 
65Supreme Court Decision No. 4603/2533. 
66Supreme Court Judgment No. 1502/2542 (1999), VICTORIA’S SECRET. 
67Supreme Court Judgment No. 3920/2551(2008), INTEL v. INTEL Lip. 
142 | A s s u m p t i o n  U n i v e r s i t y  L a w  J o u r n a l  
ปี ที่  4  ฉ บั บ ที่  2  ก ร ก ฎ า ค ม  –  ธั น ว า ค ม  2 5 5 6  
อรชุณห ์บุณยเกยีรต ิ  บทความ 
required to determine whether the Plaintiff’s trademark was a ‘well-known’ mark, and 
thus eligible for the expanded protection.  
 Although the Supreme Court opined that the objectives for protecting a well-
known trademark are to prohibit such acts of the unauthorized use of a trademark that is 
identical with or similar to the well-known mark, which public consumers maybe come 
confused or misled as to the owner or origin of goods. However, the Supreme Court 
decision did not show the criteria adopted to determine the status of the mark, or the 
guidelines, which were used by the court to determine the scope of fame, and there was 
also no indication of the factors that were determined to clearly show whether such 
evidence of fame was sufficient to enable the mark to be deemed a ‘well-known mark’ in 
Thailand. 
 In practice, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has tried to expand the 
protection to well-known/famous marks beyond the scope of confusion-based liability 
which is stipulated under the Trademark Act. However, there are no legal standards for 
determining which trademarks are eligible for such expanded protection. 
 It can be concluded that the claim for the well-known trademark against 
trademark dilution is sufficient in Thailand, if the case consists of the two main elements 
namely fame of the well-known mark and consumer’s confusion between the marks. 
Although, consumer’s confusion is substantial to show that the case falls under the 
criteria, if the owner of the trademark is well-known mark, the marks will be protected 
regardless of whether the goods are similar or dissimilar. In other words, if the trademark 
is a well-known mark, the scope of confusion will be expanding to cover dissimilar or 
non-compete goods.  
 However, it can be noted that the language used in Ministerial Regulations68 
under which criteria for determination of well-known marks consist of the two elements69, 
                                                          
68Regulations of the DIP Regarding Well-Known Marks B.E. 2548 (2005) (and 
later revised by The Regulations of the DIP Regarding Well-Known Marks B.E. 2548 
No.2). 
69Id.;   
[1] Such well-known trademark is being used in good faith until it has 
become widely known to the general consuming public ,or well-known amongst target 
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has unclear scopes of fame which could become problematic, because different scopes 
inevitably raise issues pertaining to different standards of proof. If niche fame is sufficient 
in Thailand, then evidence which shows that the mark is famous amongst a number of 
consumers in such target group would be sufficient to acquire such status.  
 In INTEL v. INTEL Lip,70 the issue of a well-known mark was raised, as the IP&IT 
court ruled that the Plaintiff’s trademark was not a ‘well-known’ mark in Thailand and 
thus, the use of the Defendant’s trademark ‘INTEL Lip’ for cosmetics did not infringe the 
Plaintiff’s trademark ‘INTEL’, which was used for computers. The Supreme Court was 
required to determine whether the Plaintiff’s trademark was a ‘well-known’ mark, and 
thus eligible for the expanded protection.  
 Although the Supreme Court opined that the objectives for protecting a well-
known trademark are to prohibit such acts of the unauthorized use of a trademark that is 
identical with or similar to the well-known mark, which public consumers maybe come 
confused or misled as to the owner or origin of goods. However, the Supreme Court 
decision did not show the criteria adopted to determine the status of the mark, or the 
guidelines, which were used by the court to determine the scope of fame, and there was 
also no indication of the factors that were determined to clearly show whether such 
evidence of fame was sufficient to enable the mark to be deemed a ‘well-known mark’ in 
Thailand. 
 From the author’s point of view, the existing Ministerial Regulations stipulate an 
unclear scope of fame. These ambiguous Regulations have consequences as they lead 
the courts to be reluctant to interpret the scope of fame, which is required in order to 
expand protection to some well-known marks. In practice, the Supreme Court, in many 
cases, has tried to expand the protection to well-known/famous marks beyond the scope 
of confusion-based liability which is stipulated under the Trademark Act. However, there 
are no legal standards for determining which trademarks are eligible for such expanded 
protection. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
consumers in Thailand.; The mark has been used widely, in Thailand or in another 
country;  
2) Such well-known trademark is being widely use until it has 
become acceptable among consumers. 
70Supreme Court Judgment No. 3920/2551(2008), INTEL v. INTEL Lip. 
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 For example, in cases involving niche fame markets, ‘VICTORIA’S SECRET’, 
‘MAGNUM’ and ‘PENTHOUSE’ would have a chance to win their respective cases, if 
they had presented proper evidence which showed that they are well-known amongst 
target consumers in the lingerie, adult magazine, and ice-cream markets as the case 
may be.  
 However, in contrast, in the general public consumer market, the owner of the 
famous mark has the burden to show that a large number of general consumers in 
Thailand are well aware of the existence of the brand. For example, with respect to 
‘MAGNUM’ Ice Cream, REDBULL, Oishi Green Tea, MK Restaurant etc., although some 
of these companies have not registered for famous mark protection under the Ministerial 
Regulations, they are still famous among general public consumers in Thailand.   
 According to studies conducted on the international scope of fame in the US, it is 
noticeable that the term ‘famous marks’ is used in the US, and is used to refer to 
trademark or service marks that enjoy a high degree of consumer recognition or which 
have acquired a widespread reputation, and are also known amongst ‘general public 
consumers’. Such famous marks may enjoy a broader scope protection than that 
provided for an ordinary mark.  
 For example, in the US, the criteria between a well-known trademark and a 
famous trademark have long been debated. The recent TDRA amended such criteria to 
require that the senior trademark be famous among general public consumers in order to 
be eligible for the anti-trademark dilution protection.  However, since the TDRA factors 
are not exclusive, the court can still develop its own judgment. Consequently, in practice, 
there are many cases71 which fail to analyze the degree of fame as required by the 
TDRA, especially in cases involving well-known trademarks that do not have a global 
degree of fame.  
 In Pet Silk Inc. v. Jackson,72 the court applied the niche degree of fame to 
determine the Plaintiff’s trademark, rather than using the criteria of the TDRA as the 
court held that:  
                                                          
71See e.g. Harris Research, Inc. v. Lydon, 505 F. Supp. 2d. 1161-65 (D. Utah 
2007), Centuary 21 Real Estate LLC v. Century Insurance Group, /no.CIV 03-0053-PHX-
SMM, 2007 WL 484555, Autozone, Inc. v. Strick, 466 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. III 2006). 
72Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson, 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
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 “the Plaintiff’s market fame is sufficient, because Pet Silk’s trademark has name 
recognition in the pet supply and dog grooming market.”73 
 As mentioned before, trademarks and trademark law are territorial, and therefore 
it is important for countries to define the scope of fame which is compatible and most 
beneficial. Hence, it is important to clarify the scope of fame, because the degree of 
fame can affect the degree of protection. In addition, the degree of fame can also 
directly affect as to whether the Thai trademark can obtain protection as a well-known 
mark, because from the author’s perspective, if Thailand sets the criteria for obtaining a 
well-known mark status too high, then some Thai trademarks which are well-known 
among a large number of target consumers may not be able to attain these levels in 
order to obtain such protection.  
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 Although Thailand has just become a party to the Paris Convention in 2008, in 
practice Thai court have long provided protection of well-known marks in accordance 
with the TRIPS Agreement, Article 16.2. Moreover, in many cases, the courts have also 
expanded protection for well-known mark to dissimilar goods, although Thailand is not 
bound to implement the obligations under Article 16.3.  
 It can be noted that Thai legal provisions are ambiguous, as the protection 
appears in many different places. In other words, the protection for well-known marks 
against the unauthorized registration is stipulated in Section 8(10) which is the provision 
empowering the trademark committee and not the well-known mark’s owner. In order to 
seek protection, the trademark owner has to seek the channel in law of passing off 
under the Penal Code and the provisions of tort under the Civil and Commercial Code.  
 Besides, there is no specific provision specifically stipulating the exclusion from 
dilution-based liability under the trademark law. Besides, there is no provision 
acknowledging the principle of fair use or exclusion of unfair enrichment like that of the 
US. In Thailand, a defendant may raise the issue of bona fide use as its defense under 
Section 47 of the Trademark Act which stipulates that:  
                                                          
73Id. at 830 (Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Fame Law: Requiring Proof of National Fame in 
Trademark Law, 33:1Cardozo L. Rev. 105 (2011)). 
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 “no registration under this Act shall interfere with any bona fide use by a person of 
his own personal name or surname, or the name of his place of business or that of any of 
his predecessors in business or the use by any person of any bona fide description of the 
character or quality of his goods.” 
 In other words, the Trademark Act has no provision acknowledging the to be 
principle of fair use, but the Trademark Act recognizes the following acts as not deemed 
an infringement; 
 - Bona fide use by a person of his own personal name or surname, or the name 
of his place of business or that of any of his predecessors in business; 
 - Bona fide use by any person of description of the character or quality of his 
goods. 
 In the U.S., in order to be liable for dilution, the defendants must use the marks 
as trademarks or trade names, which distinguish himself from other competitors, or 
which indicate his source of the goods or service.    
 - Fair use occurs when a descriptive mark is used in good faith for its primary 
meaning, rather than its secondary meaning, and no consumer confusion is likely to 
result. Defendants in a trademark infringement or dilution claim can assert two types of 
affirmative defense: fair use or parody.  
 - Nominative use occurs when use of a term is necessary for the purpose of 
identifying another producer's product, and not the users’ own product.  
 For example, in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog,74 the 4th Circuit 
Court of Appeal deemed that the use of the mark CHEWY VUITON for chewy dog toys 
was a parody of the famous trademark LOUIS VUITTON which is used for luxury 
handbags. The court noted that a parody must convey two simultaneous and 
contradictory messages which denote that: 
1) it is original, and that it is also not original; and  
2) the message of the parody must convey an element of satire, humor or  
amusement.  
 Hence, the 4th Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned that the dog toys were an 
obvious parody of the handbags. Thus, they were an imitation which was meant to poke 
                                                          
74Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 
2007). 
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fun at the elegance and exclusivity of the famous brand. The court also rejected the 
Plaintiff’s position that a parody automatically triggers actionable dilution. The Court 
opined that the act of the Defendant was a parody, and such parody is relevant to the 
overall question of whether a defendant’s use is likely to blur the distinctiveness of the 
famous brand. Thus, no dilution was found. 
 In Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc.75, the Defendant, which was a furniture 
retailer, Art Van, launched a website campaign to ask visitors to vote for their favorite 
design, One design was a brown sofa emerging from a rectangular red or burgundy 
wrapper, with ART VAN in white block letters centered across the “wrapper” and foil 
visible at the ends (the “couch bar” design). The Plaintiff, which was the owner of 
famous HERSHEY chocolate bar packaging, alleged that the Defendant’s actions 
constituted a trademark infringement and dilution by blurring, and asked for a temporary 
restraining order based on its registered and non-registered trademarks and trade dress. 
In this case, the Defendant tried to use the parody defense by arguing that the “couch 
bar” design was merely a clever parody of a candy bar, and its amusing nature therefore 
diffused any risk that consumers would mistake its source or sponsorship.  
 However, in contrast to Chewy Vuitton, the District Court summarily rejected the 
parody defense, stating that the Defendant’s reliance on the parody exception was 
misplaced. The court held that Art Van’s design was “neither similar, nor different, 
enough to convey a satirical message,” and the design “may be funny, it is not biting.” 
The Court thereby ruled in favor of the Plaintiff and suggested that a Defendant’s play 
on another parties’ mark will not automatically substantiate a parody defense. 
 Therefore, this vagueness needs to be revised, in order to bring clarity to 
activities which are not specified under the Trademark Act. Thus, the Act should be 
amended to address the following issues:     
 1. The Thai Trademark Act B.E. 2534 should be amended so that it incorporates 
trademark dilution as one of the trademark causes of action, based on the experiences 
of other countries and jurisdictions, and ultimately, to ensure that such amendments are 
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement, Article 16.3. In addition, protection for ‘well-known’ 
                                                          
75Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., No. 08-cv-14463 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 
2008). 
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marks against trademark dilution should be expanded with respect to both barring 
registrations and offering means to prevent the unauthorized use of the trademark.    
 2. The Thai Trademark Act B.E. 2534, Section 44, should be amended, in order 
to clarify the legal language pertaining to the causes of infringement, to facilitate easy 
interpretation of such law. For example, Section 10 of the UK law, clarifies the causes of 
action for trademark law, as Section 10(1) refers to infringement, and Section 10(3) 
refers to trademark dilution.   
 3. The Thai Trademark Act B.E. 2534, Section 4, should be amended to 
incorporate the definition and scope of fame in Thailand. Such amendment would 
facilitate the determination of the eligibility of the anti-dilution law.  
 4. The Thai Trademark Act B.E. 2534, Section 47, should be amended to 
incorporate the principle of ‘fair use’ as a defense against trademark infringement and 
trademark dilution. 
 5. The Department of Intellectual Property of Thailand (DIP) and other 
government agencies should encourage trademark owners, and especially Thai 
trademark owners, to create ‘well-known’ trademarks, and understand the legal benefits 
provided by well-known trademarks by establishing an organization which helps Thai 
trademark owner create strong brands, acknowledge the ‘branding strategy’ and avoid 
‘me-too’ marketing strategy. 
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